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Abstract Despite their satisfactory speech recognition capabilities, current speech assistive
devices still lack suitable automatic semantic analysis capabilities as well as useful rep-
resentation of pragmatic world knowledge. Instead, current technologies require users to
learn keywords necessary to effectively operate and work with a machine. Such a machine-
centered approach can be frustrating for users. However, recognizing a basic difference be-
tween the semiotics of humans and machines presents a possibility to overcome this short-
coming: For the machine, the meaning of a (human) utterance is defined by its own scope
of actions. Machines, thus, do not need to understand the meanings of individual words, nor
the meaning of phrasal and sentence semantics that combine individual word meanings with
additional implicit world knowledge. For speech assistive devices, the learning of machine
specific meanings of human utterances by trial and error should be sufficient. Using the triv-
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ial example of a cognitive heating device, we show that — based on dynamic semantics —
this process can be formalized as the learning of utterance-meaning pairs (UMP). This is
followed by a detailed semiotic contextualization of the previously generated signs.
Keywords Semiotics; speech assistive devices; symbolic AI; machine learning; dynamic
semantics
1 Introduction
The descriptive meaning of an utterance, such as “I go to grandma now” results composi-
tionally from the meaning of its linguistic constituents, phrases and eventually single words.
For the present example, we consider a speaker to whom the personal pronoun “I” is refer-
ring to. Moreover, this speaker announces her departure from the current place using present
tense (“go”) in the sense of nearest future (“now”) with a locative goal (“to grandma”). The
pragmatic sense of this utterance depends upon its respective context and the respective
focusses. Thus, focusing upon departure from the current place may indicate the hearer’s
privacy at the soonest. In different contexts, the focus might be centered at the intention or
the speaker’s relationship to her grandma, e.g., in such a way, that visiting the grandmother
implicates getting a substantial money gift.
Yet for the following let us assume that the hearer is a heating device in a speech-
assistive smart home environment, i.e. a cognitive heating (Klimczak et al 2014, Huber et al
2018). In this case, the abovementioned utterance could simply mean that in the nearest
future, no further heating power will be required. This meaning results on the one hand
from the heating’s range of possible actions, which could be, in the simplest case, either
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to heat or not to heat. On the other hand, it is pragmatically implicated by the speaker’s
departure from her current place (Grice 1969).
Both aspects are nontrivial and deserve closer consideration. (1) The set of meanings
for the machine results solely from its range of possible actions. In case of the cogni-
tive heating, there are only two possible actions: either turn on or turn off (deliberately
simplifying from temperature tuning here). In other words, the possible actions are ei-
ther maintaining or changing the current working state of the device. (2) In the frame-
work of compositional semantics the meaning “don’t heat”, in our example, would re-
sult from the meaning of the constituents of the utterance “I go to grandma now”, alto-
gether with pragmatic world knowledge that allows inferences from the implicature that
the speaker will be departed and that no further heating power will be necessary after-
wards (Allen 2003; 1987). This however, is not feasible at the current stage of speech
and language processing technologies. Despite marvelous achievements in speech recog-
nition technology (Bo¨ck et al 2019, Chen et al 2013, Graves et al 2013, Guo et al 2014,
Mesnil et al 2015, Sundermeyer et al 2015), neither compositional semantic analysis (Allen
2014, Allen and Teng 2018, Allen et al 2018, Bakhshandeh and Allen 2017, Galescu et al
2018, Perera et al 2017, Socher et al 2013) nor reasonable pragmatic inferences (Benz 2016,
Franke and Ja¨ger 2016, Grice 1969, van Rooij and de Jager 2012) are currently available
through artificial intelligence techniques.
The present study reformalizes and elaborates a previous paper by Klimczak and Wirsching
(2019) in terms of dynamic semantics (Ga¨rdenfors 1988, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991,
Kracht 2002, beim Graben 2014). The starting point of our analysis is an embedded cogni-
tive dynamical system (Haykin 2012), a cognitive agent, exemplified as the cognitive heat-
ing introduced above. This agent is embedded into its environment, interacting through a
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perception-action cycle (PAC) (Young 2010), where particular sensors provide information
about the state of the environment that is relevant for the agent’s behavior. In terms of the
ecological theory of meaning of von Uexku¨ll (1982), this perceptual arc couples the agent to
its subjective merkwelt. On the other hand, the agent is able to act on its subjective wirkwelt
by means of specialized effectors along its actuator arc. Sensory merkwelt and operative
wirkwelt together form the agent’s umwelt as its subjective universe.
Applied to the cognitive heating example, perception would certainly comprise sensa-
tion of temperature. But more importantly, in our case, we assume elaborated speech recog-
nition capacities, enabling the agent to successfully process and classify speech signals in
order to compute a symbolic representation of user utterances (Bo¨ck et al 2019, Graves et al
2013, Sundermeyer et al 2015). Thus the merkwelt of the cognitive heating comprises its
fundamental speech recognition capability, yet without any semantic understanding, logi-
cal reasoning, or pragmatic world knowledge. Moreover, in its most simple case considered
here, action is restricted to either switching on or off the heating furnace, thereby comprising
the agent’s binary wirkwelt.
Given this kind of perception-action cycle, we address the problem of semiosis, or sym-
bol grounding (Harnad 1990, Posner 1993): How does a cognitive agent assigns meaning to
symbolic data during language acquisition? For the cognitive heating this simply means to
assign an operation mode (to heat or not to heat) to any possible utterance, such as “I go to
grandma now”. Our particular solution, calledMachine Semiotics, is inspired by fundamen-
tal insights from constructivism (Maturana and Varela 1998, von Foerster 2003). According
to Maturana and Varela (1998), linguistic behavior of a sender aims at changing (linguistic)
behavior of the receiver (also cf. Dennett (1989), Posner (1993)).
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Applied to the cognitive heating, we propose a simple reinforcement algorithm (Skinner
1957, Sutton and Barto 2018) that changes the agent’s behavior upon any non-empty (and
non-accepted) utterance, where the meanings of utterances become learned during semiosis.
By contrast, if the machine’s operator remains silent, our algorithm interprets this kind of
linguistic behavior as consent with the current operation mode. As a consequence, silence
automatically becomes accepted by any state.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 we present the methodological techniques
used in our study, which are dynamic semantics in Sec. 2.1 and reinforcement learning in
Sec. 2.2. We suggest a learning algorithm for Machine Semiotics and prove some of its
properties. In particular, we demonstrate soundness of the algorithm. In Sec. 3 we apply the
algorithm to two example scenarios, one for the simple heating with binary decision space,
and another one for a three-valued decision space, where we show how a mental lexicon of
machine-relevant utterance-meaning pairs can be acquired. In the final Sec. 4 we discuss our
approach in a broader context.
2 Methods
We present a promising approach for solving the technical problem sketched in the Intro-
duction. The suggested solution comprises the fact that meanings are given for a machine by
a range of its possible actions to which we refer to as the action space in the following. Our
methods combine dynamic semantics (Ga¨rdenfors 1988, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991,
Kracht 2002, beim Graben 2014) with reinforcement learning (Skinner 1957, Sutton and Barto
2018).
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2.1 Dynamic Semantics
We consider a set of actions Xs where the index s (to be omitted henceforth) denotes the
particular cognitive agent under consideration. Second, we suggest reinforcement learning
as discussed by Skinner (1957) for the machine’s acquisition of verbal semantics. Skinner
argued that the meaning of a linguistic utterance, called verbal behavior b, is not directly
related to either the utterance nor to its linguistic constituents. Rather he stated that verbal
behavior b acts as a function on pragmatic antecedents a, mapping them into pragmatic
consequences c; what has been called ‘ABC’ schema. According to Skinner, the meaning
of b, conventionally denoted JbK, is a partial function from antecedents to consequences, or
formally
JbK : a 7→ c (1)
with a,c ∈ Xs as possible actions.
In this article we argue that Skinner’s ABC schema, as explained above, is compati-
ble with the ideas of dynamic semantics (Ga¨rdenfors 1988, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991,
Kracht 2002, beim Graben 2014), making this a natural candidate for reinforcement learning
of Machine Semiotics, in contrast to some claims of Chomsky (1959).
In experimental psychology, measurement data are associated to antecedents a, behavior
b and consequences c in such a way that an experimental situation is described by a joint
probability distribution p(a,b,c). Then, the meaning of (verbal) behavior can be described
in terms of Bayesian conditionalization p(a,b,c) = p(c|a,b)p(b|a)p(a). In dynamic seman-
tics this idea is known as Bayesian updating of epistemic states (Williams 1980, Ga¨rdenfors
1988, van Benthem et al 2009). Here, an epistemic state or likewise a belief state or a se-
mantic anchor (Wirsching and Lorenz 2013), is a subjective reference to a subjective reality,
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i.e. an umwelt in the sense of von Uexku¨ll (1982). In the context of Bayesian descriptions, it
becomes a (subjective) probability distribution over the subjective action space Xs of the cog-
nitive agent s (Jaynes 1957a;b). This also connects our approach to reinforcement learning as
a machine learning technology (Sutton and Barto 2018). However, in our current exposition
we refrain from probabilistic intricacies in the first place by formally modeling the learning
of machine semantics through utterance meaning pairs (UMP) (Wirsching and Lorenz 2013,
beim Graben et al 2019).
Following Skinner (1957), we assign to each compound of the ABC schema, one epis-
temic state that could change from time to time by dynamic updating. As mentioned above,
an epistemic state is a subjective reference to a subjective reality, i.e. an umwelt. For our
first most simple example, the subject is a heating device as a cognitive agent. Its subjective
reality, i.e. is action space Xs, consists of only two operation modes: to heat or not to heat. As
epistemic states, we therefore consider two subjective references, or beliefs: (1) “I operate
in heating mode” (H), and (2) “I operate in non-heating mode” (¬H). Thus, we have
X = {¬H,H} (2)
and also relations
F ⊂ X×X = {(¬H,¬H),(¬H,H),(H,¬H),(H,H)} (3)
that become utilized subsequently.
Next, we consider utterance-meaning pairs (UMP) (Wirsching and Lorenz 2013, beim Graben et al
2019).
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Definition 1 An UMP U is an ordered pair of a transcribed token of speech u = b and its
meaning JuK,
U = (u,JuK) . (4)
In dynamic semantics, meaning is defined as a partial function on epistemic states
(Ga¨rdenfors 1988, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991, Kracht 2002, beim Graben 2014). And
according to Skinner (1957) epistemic states are antecedents a and consequences c that re-
sult from applying linguistic behavior u= b onto a, i.e.
c= JuK(a) . (5)
In the sequel, we essentially follow Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Kracht (2002) and
define this partial function by explicitly enumerating the corresponding relations F ⊂ X×X .
Definition 2 The meaning JuK of an utterance u, i.e. of verbal behavior u = b, is a set of
ordered antecedent-consequent pairs
JuK = F = {(a1,c1),(a2,c2), . . .(am,cm)} , (6)
where (ai,ci) ∈ F such that ai = a j ⇒ ci = c j for i 6= j in order to make JuK a well-defined
partial function on X .
With respect to our training algorithm below, we have to endow the meaning relation
with a total order.
Definition 3 The meaning relation F = JuK is equipped with a total order (ap,cp) (aq,cq)
if p≤ q for indices p,q ∈ N0. Hence, F possesses a maximum
maxF = (am,cm)
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with m the largest index in Eq. (6).
One important notion of dynamic semantics is that of acceptance (Ga¨rdenfors 1988,
beim Graben 2014).
Definition 4 An epistemic state x ∈ X is said to accept the meaning JuK of an utterance u, if
x is a fixed point of JuK, i.e.
x= JuK(x) , (7)
conversely, JuK is said being accepted by state x ∈ X .
2.2 Reinforcement Learning
The aim of our algorithm is the construction of a mental lexicon of UMPs
MT = {U1,U2, . . . ,UT} (8)
after training time T through reinforcement learning (Skinner 1957, Sutton and Barto 2018,
beim Graben et al 2019), where
Uk = (uk,JukK)
is an UMP encountered at iteration k with meaning
JukK = {(ak1,ck1),(ak2,ck2), . . .(akmk ,ckmk)} , (9)
with (aki,cki) ∈ F . Iteration time is regarded as being discretized. To this end, we associate
to each instance of time k a corresponding ABC schema
ak
bk7−→ ck (10)
in order to model the verbal behavior of the user and the resulting machine’s actions.
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Starting from a tabula rasa state at iteration k = 0, we initialize our system with empty
lexicon M0 = /0 and antecedent state a0 ∈ X . To the behavior b0 we associate the given
utterance u0. Additionally, we assume that the cognitive heating displays its current working
(epistemic) state either visually (continuously) and/or acoustically to the user after every
state transition. Every further iteration is initialized with the consequent of the previous
iteration as antecedent state,
ak+1 ← ck (11)
for k ∈ N0.
For the sake of convenience, we introduce the following notations. LetU = (u,JuK) be a
UMP. We define two projectors P,Q such that PU = u and QU = JuK are the first and second
component ofU , respectively.
Definition 5 First, we say that a lexiconM contains an utterance u, i.e. u ∈1 M, if there is a
UMPU ∈M such that u= PU .
Definition 6 Likewise, we say M contains a meaning JuK, i.e. JuK ∈2 M if there is a UMP
U ∈M such that JuK =QU .
Definition 7 Furthermore, we say thatM contains an antecedent-consequent pair (a,c), i.e.
(a,c) ∈3 M, if there is a UMPU ∈M such that (a,c) ∈ QU .
Moreover, we define a history as a mapping from discrete time indices t ∈N0 to pairs of
UMPs and rule labels, referring to the algorithm below.
Definition 8 A function h : t→ (Ut ,rt), such that h(t,1)≡ h(t)(1) =Ut is the learned UMP
and h(t,2)≡ h(t)(2) = rt is the applied rule at time t, is called history. At initialization t = 0
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the history is given as a constant function
h(t) = ((ε , /0),ε) (12)
for all t ∈ N0. During learning these entries are consecutively overwritten by the acquired
UMPs Ut , such that there is a largest time index τ with h(t) = ((ε , /0),ε) for all t > τ , but
h(t) 6= ((ε , /0),ε) for t ≤ τ .
In general, the time index t agrees with the iteration number k. Though this is not the case
when meanings have to be revised. The history stores all UMP updates together with the
labels of the applied learning rules that happen during the learning process.
Two important operations act on this memory. First, it is necessary to know the most
recent state that has been accepted by some meaning.
Definition 9 Let h : t→ (Ut ,rt) be a history and let t0 ≤ τ be some time point during learn-
ing. Then, the function
mras(h, t0) = s
is the time index of the most recently accepted state before t = t0. That is, h(s,1) =Us and
h(s,2) = rs where rs must not be the label of the revision rule below, and Us(2) = {(a,c)}
with c = a is a meaning of the utterance Us(1) accepted by the antecedent a; and there is
no later time s < s′ ≤ t0 such that h(s
′
,1) = Us′ and h(s
′
,2) = rs′ where rs′ not being the
label of the revision rule, and Us′(2) = {(a
′
,c′)} with c′ = a′ is a meaning of the utterance
Us′(1) accepted by the antecedent a
′. In the peculiar case that no most recently accepted
state exists, the function mras returns s= 0.
Second, given the time index s of the most recently accepted state before a given time
t0, we need the latest updates of all utterances after s.
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Definition 10 Let u ∈1 M be an utterance in the mental lexiconM. Then
last(u) =maxJuK
is the latest update of u.
After those preparations, we introduce our reinforcement algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 1 comprises the following rules that operate upon the current utterance uk = bk,
its antecedent ak ∈ X , and its consequent ck ∈ X at iteration k, and also at the mental lexicon
Mk−1 depending on two crucial cases. The algorithm is initialized through k = 0, t = 0,
M0 = /0, and the empty history Eq. (12).
1. Case 1. The utterance uk has never been uttered before, uk 6∈Mk−1.
(a) Agree. If the user’s utterance is empty (silence), uk = ε , the system assumes that
she agrees with the current operation mode. Hence, the system’s state in X does not
change: ck = ak . Moreover, the lexicon is updated according to Mk ←Mk−1 ∪{Uk}
with a new UMPUk = (uk,{(ak,ck)}). Then,Uk is stored together with the rule label
1a in the history: h(t)← (Uk,1a), t ← t+1.
(b) Disagree. If the user’s utterance is not empty, uk 6= ε , the system assumes that she
does not agree with the current operation mode. Therefore, the system changes its
epistemic state from the current one ak to another state ck 6= ak. A new UMP Uk =
(uk,{(ak,ck)}) is created and added to the lexicon throughMk←Mk−1∪{Uk}. Also
Uk and rule label 1b are stored in the history: h(t)← (Uk,1b), t ← t+1.
2. Case 2. The utterance uk has been uttered before, uk ∈Mk−1. Then, lexical access yields
U = (u,JuK) ∈Mk−1 with u= uk as the current utterance, where we have to distinguish
another two cases:
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(a) Apply. There exists an antecedent-consequent pair (a,c) ∈ JuK such that the present
state ak = a. Then, apply the corresponding transition ak 7→ c. Afterwards create a
new UMP U = (u,{(a,c)}) to be stored in the history together with the rule label
h(t)← (U,2a), t ← t+1.
(b) Learn. There is no antecedent-consequent pair (a,c) ∈ JuK such that ak = a. In this
case, the agent has to augment the meaning of JuK as follows.
i. Agree. If the user’s utterance is empty (silence), uk = ε , the system assumes
that she consents to the current operation mode. Therefore ck = ak, again. Then,
firstly,Mk←Mk−1\{U}, secondly,U is updated according to JεK← JεK∪{Uk}
with a newly created Uk = (ak,ck), thirdly, Mk ←Mk ∪{U}, fourthly, store Uk
and rule label in the history: h(t)← (Uk,2(b)i), t ← t+1.
ii. Disagree. If the user’s utterance is not empty, uk 6= ε , the system assumes that
she does not agree with the current operation mode. Thus, it makes a state
transition ak 7→ ck (ck 6= ak). Then, again firstly,Mk←Mk−1 \{U}, secondly,U
is updated according to JuK← JuK∪{Uk}withUk =(ak,ck), thirdly,Mk←Mk∪
{U}, and fourthly, store Uk and rule label in the history: h(t)← (Uk,2(b)ii),
t← t+1.
3. Revise. If an utterance uk, that is not accepted by the current antecedent ak (i.e. JukK(ak) 6=
ak) immediately follows a history of unaccepted utterances, then the recently acquired
meaning of uk revises that of all earlier utterances in that history as follows. First, the
time point s = mras(h,τ) of the most recently accepted state at training time τ , is ren-
dered from the history. Then, for all times s< p≤ τ , the latest update (ap,cp) = last(up)
of the utterances up =Up(1) withUp = h(p,1) is retrieved and revised according to
JupK← (JupK\{(ap,cp)})∪{(ap,ck)}
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with ck 6= cp. Afterwards the revisedUp together with rule label 3 is stored in the history:
h(t)← (Up,3), t ← t+1.
Algorithm 1 continuously checks whether an utterance has been presented to the agent
before. If this was not the case, rule 1 applies, otherwise, the system switches into mode 2. In
both cases, we assume that an empty utterance (1a, 2(b)i) means that the operator endorses
the current action state of the machine. However, if the utterance is not empty, the user
does not agree with the machine state (1b, 2(b)ii). For our simple model of the cognitive
heating with binary action space (2), the current state a is just changed into its opposite
state ¬a. Yet, for a more complex setting with more than two states, the agent has to find
the appropriate response. The most simple way to achieve this, is by probing all possible
consequences through trial and error. More suitable solutions could exploit Markov decision
processes (MDP) for instance (Sutton and Barto 2018). Particularly special cases are the
rules 2a and 3. Apply 2a takes place when the utterance belongs to the acquired lexicon and
the antecedent of its meaning is associated with a known consequent. Then, the agent carries
out the prescribed state transition. Finally, our revision rule 3 revises an entire history of
unaccepted utterances starting with the earliest unaccepted utterance immediately following
the most recently accepted utterance. The revision rule rests on the implicit assumption that
the state transition induced by the current utterance is the one desired by the user, thereby
replacing all “wrongly” learned consequences in the history by the current one, such that the
previously learned antecedents are mapped to the current consequence. Moreover, this rule
assumes that a sequence of unaccepted utterances indicates an abiding misunderstanding
between the user and the agent that must be ruled out at once by the latest revision.
One obvious property of the algorithm 1 is stated as the following proposition.
Machine Semiotics 15
Proposition 1 The meaning of silence accepts any epistemic state, JεK= id.
Next, we have to consider whether the proposed algorithm is sound and complete.
Clearly, the algorithm cannot be complete for it attributes meaning to principally any ut-
terance, even to interjections such as “uh”, “oeh”, and “mmh”. By contrast, we may regard
soundness as the constraint that the acquired relations F between antecedent-consequent
pairs is a proper partial function in the sense of Eq. (6). Then we could prove soundness as
follows.
Theorem 1 The learning algorithm 1 is sound.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm has already learned that the meaning of an utterance u con-
tains one antecedent-consequent pair (a,c) ∈ JuK. Further assuming that another pair (a,c′),
c′ 6= c should be learned as well. This does not happen, because the algorithm recognizes the
antecedent a and goes into apply mode according to rule 2a instead of learning the meaning
(a,c′) ∈ JuK which would yield an inconsistent partial function F.
3 Results
In this section we present two different training scenarios for our example of a cognitive
heating device (Klimczak et al 2014, Huber et al 2018). In the first scenario, we discuss
the motivating example from Sec. 2.1 with only two operation modes: heating (H) and
non-heating (¬H) [Eq. (2)]. The second scenario then deals with a slightly more complex
umwelt comprising three actions: non-heating (¬H), semi-heating S and full-heating H. We
initialize the system at time k= 0 with empty lexiconM0 = /0 and its current operation mode
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H (assuming that the heating heats at time k= 0). Therefore the antecedent state a0 =H. To
the behavior b0 we associate the given utterance u0.
3.1 First Scenario
In the first scenario we train the system with the following sequence of utterances:
s1 = (ε ,I go to grandma now,ε ,I go to grandma now,
no!,ε ,heat!,I go to grandma now,I go to grandma now,ε ,good boy!,
I go to grandma now,I go to grandma now) . (13)
We use typewriter font to denote the transcription of the speech tokens, thereby abstracting
from its conventional and compositional meaning in the first place.
According to the intuition behind algorithm 1, the user approves the initial working
state by an empty utterance. Then, she changes her mind and desires a state transition by
uttering I go to grandma now, which is subsequently endorsed by silence in the third it-
eration. By repeating the last utterance in the fourth step, another state change is requested.
However, the corresponding transition is punished by the utterance no! and the meaning of
I go to grandma now becomes revised through reinforcement learning. In the sixth iter-
ation, the current operation mode is endorsed by the users silence. In iteration seven, we
demonstrate that the machine is even able to cope with confounding inputs, when a con-
fused user firstly utters heat! and secondly corrects herself by I go to grandma now, de-
siring the heating to be turned off. Then, the user appears as completely deranged when
repeating the last utterance again. The correction is rewarded by the empty utterance in step
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ten. Finally, we show how the algorithm can also learn the partially affirmative meaning of
good boy! in three further reinforcement steps.
First iteration. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the user remains silent at time
k = 0, such that the initial utterance is the empty word u0 = ε . Then,
b0 = u0 = ε
at time k= 0. Thus, rule 1a applies and the system does not change its operation mode while
the user remains silent. As a consequence we obtain the epistemic state
c0 = H .
Thereby the first meaning becomes
JεK= {(H,H)} .
Correspondingly, the learned UMP is
U0 = (ε ,{(H,H)}) .
According to rule 1a the lexicon gets
M1 = {(ε ,{(H,H)})} .
Second iteration. At the next iteration at time k = 1, the antecedent becomes dynamically
initialized with the consequence from the previous time step [Eq. (11)]:
a1 ← c0 .
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In our particular case, we have a1 =H. As before, we associate to the current verbal behavior
b1 the utterance u1, now letting u1 = I go to grandma now. Then,
u1 = b1 = I go to grandma now ,
and
c1 = ¬H
according to training rule 1b where a non-empty utterance indicates the users’ desire to
change the heating’s operation mode from heating H to non-heating ¬H. Therefore,
JI go to grandma nowK = {(H,¬H)} .
The resulting UMP is then
U1 = (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)}) .
Since the UMPU1 is not contained in the lexicon M1 from the first iteration, we simply
obtain the updated mental lexicon
M2 =M1∪{U1} ,
i.e.
M2 = {(ε ,{(H,H)}),(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)})} .
Third iteration. The third iteration starts with antecedent a2 = c1 = ¬H and processes ut-
terance u2 = b2 = ε due to (13). Since the utterance is already known to the device, it has
to consider rules 2. As it does not find the antecedent ¬H in the meaning definition JεK, it
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proceeds with rule 2(b)i. Thus,
U = (ε ,{(H,H)})
U2 = (ε ,{(¬H,¬H)})
JεK ← JεK∪{(¬H,¬H)}
U ← (ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)})
M3 = {(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)})} .
Fourth iteration. In the next iteration we have antecedent a3 = c2 = ¬H and interpret ut-
terance u3 = b3 = I go to grandma now again [Eq. (13)]. The utterance is known to the
agent, and we adopt rule 2(b)ii because the antecedent does not occur in the previous mean-
ing definition. Then,
U = (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)})
U3 = (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,H)
∗})
JI go to grandma nowK ← JI go to grandma nowK∪{(¬H,H)∗}
U ← (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,H)∗}) .
Note that the newly acquired meaning (¬H,H) ∈ JI go to grandma nowK is pragmat-
ically not appropriate (Grice 1969). We henceforth indicate this kind of “wrong” knowledge
by the asterisk ∗.
Thereby, the updated lexicon becomes
M4 = {(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,H)
∗})} .
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Fifth iteration. The meaning of I go to grandma now acquired in the last training step is
at variance with the pragmatic implicature discussed in Sec. 1 because the heating is turned
on when it was off previously (Grice 1969). Therefore, the user utters no! First of all, as
u4 6= ε , the user does not consent to the antecedent state a4 = H and desires consequence
c4 = ¬H, instead. Hence, the agent learns a new meaning
Jno!K = {(H,¬H)} .
The learned UMP is then
U4 = (no!,{(H,¬H)}) .
According to rule 1a the lexicon gets
M5 =M4∪{(no!,{(H,¬H)})} .
However, as u4 immediately follows the utterance u3, we also have to take the revision
rule 3 of the reinforcement learning algorithm into account. To this aim, the machine checks
whether the antecedent a4 = H was accepted by the meaning of u4. This was not the case,
as
c4 = Jno!K(a4) = Jno!K(H) = ¬H .
Hence, the consequence in the already learned meaning definition of u3 is replaced by the
currently desired consequence. Thus,
JI go to grandma nowK← (JI go to grandma nowK\{(¬H,H)})∪{(¬H,¬H)}
and thus
M5←{(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,¬H)}),(no!,{(H,¬H)})} .
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As a consequence, I go to grandma now assumes the intended meaning in the lexicon
M5, i.e.
JI go to grandma nowK = {(H,¬H),(¬H,¬H)} , (14)
i.e. turn off the heating anyways, which is the correct pragmatic implicature that no heating
power is required in case of the user’s absence.
Sixth iteration. In the next iteration, where a5 = c4 = ¬H, the user expresses consent with
the current working state of the heating by empty utterance u5 = ε . Because u5 has been
uttered before and its antecedent a5 is known in the lexicon, rule 2a, i.e, apply takes place:
the working state does not change, there is no learning and nothing is revised.
So far all rules of algorithm 1 have been applied. As stated in proposition 1, the empty
utterance ε is accepted by all epistemic states, which can be interpreted as an affirmation.
The meaning of I go to grandma now has been learned as the intended pragmatic impli-
cature that no heating power is required during absence of the user. The meaning of no! has
been partially acquired. Finally, the revision rule 3 was triggered by an unaccepted utterance
no!.
Seventh iteration. Next, we investigate how the cognitive heating is able to cope with con-
founding information uttered by a slightly bemused user. Therefore, the machine has to
process u6 = heat! in state a6 = c5 = ¬H. For u6, which is not empty, has never been
encountered before, rule 1b applies as
Jheat!K = {(¬H,H)} .
The resulting UMP is then
U6 = (heat!,{(¬H,H)}) .
22 Klimczak, Wirsching & beim Graben
Because the UMPU6 is not contained in the lexiconM5 from the last iteration, we obtain
the updated mental lexicon
M6 =M5∪{U6} ,
i.e.
M6 = {(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,¬H)}),
(no!,{(H,¬H)}),(heat!,{(¬H,H)})} .
Eighth iteration. Although the last utterance has adopted the correct meaning, it is pragmati-
cally inappropriate. Thus, the user makes a correction by uttering u7 = I go to grandma now,
again. First, the dynamic meaning of u7 is applied to the current state a7 = c6 =H according
to rule 2a, leading to the state transition
c7 = JI go to grandma nowK(a7) = JI go to grandma nowK(H) = ¬H .
Second, since c7 6= a7, the antecedent a7 does not accept the meaning of I go to grandma now,
triggering thereby a revision of u6, which leads to
Jheat!K← (Jheat!K\{(¬H,H)})∪{(¬H,¬H)∗}
where the learned antecedent is (erroneously) associated with the current consequence.
Nineth iteration. Now we assume that the user appears deranged to such an extent that she
repeats the last utterance once again: u8 = I go to grandma now. Because the working
state is a8 = c7 = ¬H belongs to the meaning definition of u8, this is applied through
c8 = JI go to grandma nowK(a8) = JI go to grandma nowK(¬H) = ¬H = a8
which is a fixed point of JI go to grandma nowK. Therefore, the antecedent a8 accepts the
meaning of u8, preventing further revision.
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Tenth iteration. The user gives silent consent. Here we have a9 = c8 = ¬H and u9 = ε ,
which is straightforwardly applied as
c9 = JεK(a9) = JεK(¬H) = ¬H = a9 .
Eleventh iteration. We finish the first scenario by the acquisition of affirmative meanings.
In state a10 = c9 = ¬H, the user utters u10 = good boy! which is a non-empty unknown
phrase that leads to lexicon update according to rule 1b, such that
Jgood boy!K = {(¬H,H)∗} .
The resulting UMP is then
U10 = (good boy!,{(¬H,H)
∗}) .
Since UMPU10 is not contained in the current lexicon this becomes updated through
M7 = {(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,¬H)}),
(no!,{(H,¬H)}),(heat!,{(¬H,H)}),(good boy!,{(¬H,H)∗})} .
Twelfth iteration. Because, the meaning of good boy! has been erroneously acquired in the
last iteration, the user immediately utters u11 = I go to grandma now to enforce a revision
in state a11 = c10 = H. Its application yields
c11 = JI go to grandma nowK(a11) = JI go to grandma nowK(H) = ¬H .
Hence, the meaning of I go to grandma now is not accepted by the antecedent a11,
thereby causing u10 to be revised, leading to
Jgood boy!K← (Jgood boy!K\{(¬H,H)})∪{(¬H,¬H)} .
Now, the meaning of good boy! accepts the state ¬H as desired.
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Thirteenth iteration. The still slightly confused user terminates this scenario by another
reassuring u12 = I go to grandma now in operation mode a12 = c11 = ¬H which leads to
a final application of rule 2a:
c12 = JI go to grandma nowK(a12) = JI go to grandma nowK(¬H) = ¬H = a12
accepting the antecedent a12. Therefore, no revision is induced.
Finally, we condense the epistemic updating dynamics of this scenario in Tab. 1.
Table 1 Dynamic Machine Semiotics for the first scenario (13). The asterisk∗ indicates wrong knowledge.
Variables are k: iteration, t: time stamp, ak : antecedent, bk : behavior (utterance uk), ck : consequence, Ut :
learned utterance-meaning pair (UMP), rule: the applied rule of algorithm 1. The history from definition 8 is
rendered from the last two columns.
k t ak bk ck Ut rule
0 0 H ε H (ε ,{(H,H)}) 1a
1 1 H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)}) 1b
2 2 ¬H ε ¬H (ε ,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2(b)i
3 3 ¬H I go to grandma now H (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,H)∗}) 2(b)ii
4 4 H no! ¬H (no!,{(H,¬H)}) 1b
5 (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,¬H)}) 3
5 6 ¬H ε ¬H (ε ,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2a
6 7 ¬H heat! H (heat!,{(¬H,H)}) 1b
7 8 H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)}) 2a
9 (heat!,{(¬H,¬H)∗}) 3
8 10 ¬H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2a
9 11 ¬H ε ¬H (ε ,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2a
10 12 ¬H good boy! H (good boy!,{(¬H,H)∗}) 1b
11 13 H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)}) 2a
14 (good boy!,{(¬H,¬H)}) 3
12 15 ¬H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2a
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3.2 Second Scenario
In the second scenario we consider an augmented epistemic space X comprising three op-
eration modes: don’t heat ¬H, heat H and semi-heat S. We also introduce an intrinsic state
dynamics Φ that circulates between these modes through Φ(¬H) = S, Φ(S) = H, and
Φ(H) = ¬H, for all unknown utterances.
Due to the different umwelt, we process a slightly deviant sequence of utterances here:
s2 = (ε ,I go to grandma now,ε ,I go to grandma now,
no!,no!,ε ,heat!,I go to grandma now,I go to grandma now,ε ,good boy!,
I go to grandma now,I go to grandma now) . (15)
The only difference in comparison to scenario (13) is the repetition of no! in step six.
The first ten steps of the resulting updating dynamics of this scenario are depicted in
Tab. 2.
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Table 2 Beginning of the Machine Semiotics for the second scenario (13). The asterisk∗ indicates wrong
knowledge. Variables are k: iteration, t: time stamp, ak: antecedent, bk: behavior (utterance uk), ck: conse-
quence, Ut : learned utterance-meaning pair (UMP), rule: the applied rule of algorithm 1. The history from
definition 8 is rendered from the last two columns.
k t ak bk ck Ut rule
0 0 H ε H (ε ,{(H,H)}) 1a
1 1 H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)}) 1b
2 2 ¬H ε ¬H (ε ,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2(b)i
3 3 ¬H I go to grandma now S (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,S)∗}) 2(b)ii
4 4 S no! H (no!,{(S,H)}) 1b
5 (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,H)∗}) 3
5 6 H no! ¬H (no!,{(H,¬H)}) 2(b)ii
7 (no!,{(S,¬H)}) 3
8 (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,¬H)}) 3
6 9 ¬H ε ¬H (ε ,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2a
Steps 0 to 2 are the very same as in the first scenario shown in Tab. 1. Yet note that the
empty utterance ε was accepted by state ¬H in step 2. Beginning with step 3 the Machine
Semiotics evolves differently due to the presence of three action states, when the meaning of
I go to grandma now is erroneously acquired as (¬H,S). In step 4, the user therefore trig-
gers a first revision by uttering no! that is, however pragmatically undesired, carried out in
step 5. Therefore, the user repeats no! in step 6. At this point the user-machine communica-
tion has accumulated abiding misunderstandings must be resolved at once in the succeeding
steps 7 and 8. This requires the formal concepts prepared in Sec. 2.2.
First the system renders the most recently accepted state mras(h,6) = 2 from the his-
tory h according to definition 9. Then the history h(t) is scanned for time indices t =
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3, . . . ,6 for the last meaning updates. In step 7 the meaning of no! learned in step 4 is
revised by replacing the acquired consequent H by the newly desired consequent ¬H while
keeping its antecedent S. Moreover, in step 8 the pragmatically inappropriate meaning of
I go to grandma now is revised from (¬H,H) to (¬H,¬H), i.e. “don’t heat during ab-
sence of the user”. The first training phase terminates in step 9 by accepting the empty
utterance in state ¬H.
The mental lexicon acquired until step 9 is given as
M7 = {(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,¬H)}),
(no!,{(H,¬H),(S,¬H)})} .
In M7 the empty utterance ε acts as a partial affirmation accepting any state. The utterance
I go to grandma now pragmatically implicates that no heating power is required when the
user is departed. Finally, no! means that neither full nor semi-heating are desired.
The next Table 3 presents the continuation of the three-state Machine Semiotics in case
of confounding information from a somewhat bewildered user.
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Table 3 Continuation of the Machine Semiotics for the second scenario (13). The asterisk∗ indicates wrong
knowledge. Variables are k: iteration, t: time stamp, ak: antecedent, bk: behavior (utterance uk), ck: conse-
quence, Ut : learned utterance-meaning pair (UMP), rule: the applied rule of algorithm 1. The history from
definition 8 is rendered from the last two columns.
k t ak bk ck Ut rule
7 10 ¬H heat! S (heat!,{(¬H,S)}) 1b
8 11 S I go to grandma now H (I go to grandma now,{(S,H)∗}) 2(b)ii
12 (heat!,{(¬H,H)}) 3
9 13 H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H)}) 2a
14 (I go to grandma now,{(S,¬H)}) 3
15 (heat!,{(¬H,¬H)∗}) 3
Although the user wants to visit her grandmother, she utters heat! which would have
been correctly learned as switching into (semi-)heating mode from non-heating under nor-
mal circumstances. However, as heating power is unwanted in the present context, she says
I go to grandma now in step 11 again. This triggers another revision in step 12 where the
previously associated consequent S is replaced by the current H in the meaning of heat!.
Thereby, the machine even further increases its heating power, instead of shutting down.
Hence the user repeats the correctly learned I go to grandma now in step 13.
Now the system has again accumulated abiding misunderstanding that must be corrected
at once. To this end, the most recently accepted state mras(h,13) = 9 is rendered from the
history h which is scanned for time indices t = 10, . . . ,13 for the last updates afterwards. As
a consequence, the meanings of I go to grandma now and heat! are revised according to
the rule 3 of algorithm 1.
Machine Semiotics 29
The mental lexicon acquired sofar is then
M10 = {(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),
(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,¬H),(S,¬H)}),
(no!,{(H,¬H),(S,¬H)}),(heat!,{(¬H,¬H)∗})} ,
where the meaning of I go to grandma now has been correctly augmented by another
antecedent-consequent pair (S,¬H), while the meaning of heat! became “don’t heat” when
the heater was turned off before, which is at variance with the intended implicature.
We conclude this scenario with the acquisition of a corroboration meaning again. This
is shown in Tab. 4.
Table 4 Finalization of the Machine Semiotics for the second scenario (13). The asterisk∗ indicates wrong
knowledge. Variables are k: iteration, t: time stamp, ak: antecedent, bk: behavior (utterance uk), ck: conse-
quence, Ut : learned utterance-meaning pair (UMP), rule: the applied rule of algorithm 1. The history from
definition 8 is rendered from the last two columns.
k t ak bk ck Ut rule
10 16 ¬H ε ¬H (ε ,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2a
11 17 ¬H good boy! S (good boy!,{(¬H,S)∗}) 1b
12 18 S I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(S,¬H)}) 2a
19 (good boy!,{(¬H,¬H)}) 3
13 20 ¬H I go to grandma now ¬H (I go to grandma now,{(¬H,¬H)}) 2a
In step 16, the action state ¬H accepts the empty utterance ε through application (rule
2a). Then, in step 17, the user utters the unknown good boy!, thereby inducing a state
transition S = Φ(¬H) by virtue of the intrinsic periodic dynamics, which becomes learned
according to rule 1b. However, for the user intends good boy! to be pragmatically affirma-
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tive, she repeats I go to grandma now in step 18 yielding ¬H when applied to the present
state S. Furthermore, good boy! is revised to the intended corroborative meaning (¬H,¬H)
in step 19. Finally, in step 20, the user wants to ensure the last transition by another utterance
of I go to grandma now which is accepted by the epistemic state ¬H, thus preventing any
further revisions.
Eventually the lexicon
M14 = {(ε ,{(H,H),(¬H,¬H)}),
(I go to grandma now,{(H,¬H),(¬H,¬H),(S,¬H)}),
(no!,{(H,¬H),(S,¬H)}),(heat!,{(¬H,¬H)∗}),
(good boy!,{(¬H,¬H)})} ,
has been learned by virtue of Machine Semiotics.
4 Discussion
In this study we have proposedMachine Semiotics as a viable approach to train speech assis-
tive cognitive user interfaces in a perception-action cycle (PAC) between user and a cognitive
dynamic system (Haykin 2012, Young 2010) through reinforcement learning of antecedent-
consequent relations (Skinner 1957, Sutton and Barto 2018). Our approach essentially rests
on constructivist semiotics (Maturana and Varela 1998, von Foerster 2003) and biosemiotics
(von Uexku¨ll 1982). Assuming the existence of species- and specimem-relative PACs for an
individual in its ecological niche, its umwelt splits into a merkwelt, corresponding to its
specific perception, and a wirkwelt, corresponding to its particular action faculties, in such
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a way that the individual’s sensors provide only relevant information about the state of the
environment, where relevance is characterized by the individual’s action capabilities.
Von Uexku¨ll (1982) has nicely illustrated this idea by means of a tick, sitting on a tree
branch and awaiting a mammal to attack. The tick has a largely reduced sensory system,
basically comprising temperature, butyric acid smell, and fury touch. Thus, the meaning of
“mammal” in the tick’s merkwelt is simply “musty fury warmth”. Yet, every perception is
attributed to a corresponding action: An increase of the butyric acid concentration in the
air causes release from the branch to land in the prey’s coat. Afterwards, the tick crawls
toward the skin by avoiding the prey’s hairs. Finally, maximal temperature induces the tick
to sting the mammal’s skin and sucking its blood. Thus, each percept becomes meaningfully
relevant only in light of its corresponding action from the tick’s wirkwelt. Correspondingly,
the meaning of “mammal” in the tick’s wirkwelt becomes the action sequence: release,
crawl, and sting.
Applied to a toy model of a cognitive heating (Klimczak et al 2014, Huber et al 2018),
the merkwelt is constituted by temperature sensation in combination with a basic symbolic
language representation (Bo¨ck et al 2019, Chen et al 2013, Graves et al 2013, Guo et al 2014,
Mesnil et al 2015, Sundermeyer et al 2015) (where we deliberately have neglected its pecu-
liar intricacies here). On the other hand, the wirkwelt of the device comprises (in our first
scenario) only two possible actions: to heat or not to heat, together with displaying the cur-
rent operation mode to the user. Following the constructivist approach ofMaturana and Varela
(1998), that linguistic behavior of a sender aims at changing the behavior of the receiver, we
interpret the meaning of the users’ linguistic behaviors as mappings from antecedent onto
consequent action states. This so-called ABC schema of verbal behavior (Skinner 1957)
forms the foundation of dynamic semantics (Ga¨rdenfors 1988, Groenendijk and Stokhof
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1991, Kracht 2002, beim Graben 2014) and interactive pragmatics (Benz 2016, Franke and Ja¨ger
2016, Grice 1969, van Rooij and de Jager 2012).
Accordingly, our Machine Semiotics substantially utilizes the basic tenets of dynamic
semantics. The meaning of an utterance is a partial function upon a space of epistemic action
states and fixed points of those meaning functions define the important concept of accep-
tance. Our training algorithm describes the acquisition of semantic and pragmatic world
knowledge from an ecological point of view (von Uexku¨ll 1982). Starting from two crucial
assumptions, that (1) silence of the user endorses a current operation mode, and (2) linguistic
behavior indicates disagreement with a current operation mode, we have proposed a rein-
forcement mechanism which continually revises inappropriate meanings upon upcoming
new input. We have illustrated this algorithm in two case scenarios. The first one describes
the two-state cognitive heating mentioned above where revision simply replaces a conse-
quent state by its complement while keeping the antecedent. In a slightly more involved
three-state scenario, we have employed an intrinsic periodic update dynamics. In both set-
tings, we have abstractly represented the meaning of a user’s utterance in the heater’s wirk-
welt through an action of its epistemic state space.
Our reinforcement learning algorithm can be straightforwardly generalized toward even
more complex state spaces either by means of a simple trial and error updating process, or,
perhaps more appropriately, through Markov decision processes (Haykin 2012, Sutton and Barto
2018). Moreover, the acquired mental lexicon can be efficiently stored in a neural associa-
tive network rendering a meaning pattern as output for a given input utterance. This could be
achieved by combining vector-symbolic architectures (Fernandez et al 2018, Gayler 2006,
beim Graben and Potthast 2009, Smolensky 1990) with deep neural networks (LeCun et al
2015, Fernandez et al 2018) for a neural network implementation of Machine Semiotics.
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The Machine Semiotics approach does not require the user to memorize particular key-
words to which the device is instructed to respond by means of slot-filling semantics (Allen
1987, Chen et al 2013, Guo et al 2014, Mesnil et al 2015). By contrast, Machine Semiotics
adapts its linguistic behavior flexibly to the user during language acquisition. Yet for com-
mercial use, it could be more appropriate to deliver the system with a pre-trained mental
lexicon, containing the most probable utterances in their stereotypical pragmatic contexts.
Although Machine Semiotics is explicitly devised as a machine learning attempt for arti-
ficial intelligence, one might speculate about its tentative relevance for human language ac-
quisition and semiosis in general. According to Harnad (1990) the “symbol grounding prob-
lem” for assigning symbolic “meaning” to almost continuous perceptions could be solved by
means of “discrimination and identification”. The former process creates “iconic represen-
tations” by training classifiers; the latter gives rise to conceptual categorizations. Yet these
processes emphasize the perceptional aspects of the perception-action cycle. On the other
hand, Steels (2006) argued that also the action space of embodied agents must be taken into
account. This is actually achieved by Machine Semiotics.
Finally, we state that the Machine Semiotics outlined sofar is only able to acquire
machine-relevant meanings only in form of instructions that aim at directly changing the be-
havior of the receiver (Maturana and Varela 1998, von Foerster 2003). In terms of Dennett
(1989) and Posner (1993) these refer to first-order intentional systems or the first level of re-
flection, respectively. Here, “a first-order intentional system has beliefs and desires (etc.) but
no beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires” (Dennett 1989, p. 243). Correspondingly,
a system at the first level of reflection either “beliefs something [. . . ] or intends something.”
(Posner 1993, p. 227). Yet consider a user who wants the machine to believe some propo-
sition that is not directly related to its action. This would require a second-order intentional
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system which “has believes and desires [. . . ] about beliefs and desires” (Dennett 1989, op.
cit.), or equivalently, on the second level of reflection, “a believes that b intends a to believe
something, and b intends a to believe that b intends something.” (Posner 1993, op. cit.). A
Machine Semiotics that is able to deal with such scenarios would definitely demand a re-
cursively structured epistemic state space together with a Theory of Mind about the user’s
epistemic states; we expect that such a sophisticated cognitive user interface would have its
own mental life and must be treated like a human being.
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